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	 In	 the	 event	 of	 a	 firm	 becoming	 the	 target	 of	 a	 takeover	 attempt	 it	 is	 largely	 at	
management’s	discretion	as	to	whether,	and	by	what	means,	to	resist	the	bid.	One	hypothesis	is	





Baron,	 1983).	With	 large,	 potentially	 divergent	 stakes	 for	 shareholders	 and	managers,	 there	
remains	 the	 challenge	 for	 researchers,	 and	 corporate	 legislators	 in	 contemplating	 placing	
restrictions	on	managerial	discretion	 (such	as	a	passivity/no	board	veto	 rule),	of	 establishing	




reducing	 defensive	 strategy,	 can	 be	 beneficial	 for	 shareholders.2	 This	 is	 because	 only	 by	
deploying,	or	threatening	to	deploy,	a	value‐reducing	defensive	strategy	(such	as	the	other	post‐




1	Easterbrook	and	Fischel	 (1981)	are	 the	 first	 to	make	 the	case	 for	altogether	 removing	management’s	
discretion	as	to	whether,	and	by	what	means,	to	resist	a	bid.	A	more	recent	case	for	the	enactment	of	a	no	









	 However,	 the	decision	by	management	 to	 resist	 a	 bid,	 and	potentially	deploy	 a	 value‐
reducing	defensive	strategy,	 is	 likely	 to	depend	on	the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	
provisions	 (such	 as	 the	 pre‐bid	 defenses	 –	 staggered/classified	 board,	 super‐majority	
amendment,	 fair	 price	 amendment,	 and	 poison	 pill	 –	 that	 Ruback,	 1987,	 also	 describes).	 The	
hypothesized	motives	for	management	to	deploy	pre‐bid	defenses	are	similar	to	those	for	post‐
offer	defenses	(that	 is,	 increased	bargaining	power	or	managerial	entrenchment).	Straska	and	
Waller	 (2014)	 discuss	 these	motives	 at	 length	 in	 the	 context	 of	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	
provide	an	extensive	review	of	the	associated	literature.	As	they	draw	to	the	reader’s	attention,	a	
common	way	 to	proxy	 for	 the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	 is	 to	use	 the	
Gompers,	 Ishii,	 and	Metrick	 (2003)	 index	 (hereafter	 the	GIM	 index),	which	adds	one	 for	 each	
antitakeover	provision	that	a	firm	has	from	a	total	of	twenty‐four.	As	such,	we	hypothesize	the	
following	 dependences,	 conditional	 on	 motive,	 between	 the	 target	 firm’s	 GIM	 index	 and	 the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance.	On	the	one	hand,	a	negative	relationship	 is	expected	for	
management	resistance	that	 is	motivated	by	price	improvement.	This	 is	because	a	higher	GIM	








instrument	 for	 the	 GIM	 index	 in	 ways	 similar	 to	 Karpoff,	 Schonlau,	 and	Wehrley	 (2017),	 by	











firm	relatively	more	vulnerable	 to	a	bid,	most	 reincorporation	activity	 took	place	many	years	
before	it	could	have	plausibly	anticipated	aspects	of	the	bids,	including	management	resistance,	
in	our	sample	(see	Catan	and	Kahan,	2016).			
Without	 using	 the	 instruments,	 we	 find	 a	 positive	 but	 statistically	 insignificant	
relationship	 between	 the	 GIM	 index	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	 management	 resistance.	 Strongly	
supported	by	tests	of	instrument	validity	and	endogeneity,	the	relationship	becomes	statistically	




steeper	 in	 gradient	 than	 the	 biased	 one	 indicates	 that	 the	 GIM	 index	 is	 reversely,	 negatively	
related	 to	 the	 likelihood	 of	 management	 resistance	 because	 unobservable	 factors	 and	











variation	 for	 the	 GIM	 index	 that	 are	 plausibly	 exogenous	 to	 the	 likelihood	 of	 management	
resistance,	 the	 pre‐determined	 effect	 of	 the	 GIM	 index	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 managerial	
entrenchment	that	actually	causes	managers	to	resist	a	bid.	To	state	 it	 the	other	way,	that	the	
causal	relationship	is	positive,	and	not	negative,	suggests	that	management	resistance	is	not	used	
to	compensate	 for	a	 lower	GIM	index	being	 less	sufficient	on	 its	own	to	elicit	or	bargain	 for	a	
higher	quality	offer.	
We	 confirm	 the	 findings	 of	 Karpoff	 et	 al	 (2017),	 but	 also	 find	 evidence,	 from	 the	 bid	
lambda,	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	deterrent	effect	of	 a	higher	GIM	 index	 is	decreasing	 in	 the	 cost	of	
acquiring	information	about	the	firm.	In	the	event	of	failing	to	deter	a	bid,	therefore,	the	likelihood	
of	 management	 resistance	 is	 increasing	 in	 the	 GIM	 index,	 no	 matter	 the	 cost	 of	 acquiring	
information	about	the	target	firm.	The	causal	relationship	is	also	traceable	in	the	reduced	form	
and	 robust	 to	 using	 an	 additive	 or	 binary/threshold‐based	 GIM	 index,	 and	 rolling	 or	 fixed	
instruments.	 However,	 we	 find	 that	 the	 relationship	 depends	 on	 the	 subset	 of	 antitakeover	
provisions	 that	 excludes	 the	 six	 provisions	 –	 including	 classified	 board,	 super‐majority	
amendment,	and	poison	pill	–	in	the	Bebchuk,	Cohen,	and	Ferrell	(2009)	index	(hereafter	the	BCF	
index).	 We	 confirm	 the	 findings	 of	 Karpoff	 et	 al	 (2017)	 that	 an	 index	 of	 the	 other	 sixteen	














cost	 of	 acquiring	 information	 about	 the	 target	 firm,	 in	 the	 IV	 regression.	 Without	 using	 the	
instrument,	we	find	a	negative,	statistically	significant	and	economically	meaningful	relationship	
between	the	initial	premium	and	the	likelihood	of	management	resistance,	as	is	expected	for	the	




Bates	 and	 Becher	 (2017)	 find	 that	 management	 resistance	 leads	 to	 price	 improvement	 it	 is	
unlikely	 to	 be	 price	 improvement	 that	 actually	 causes	 managers	 to	 resist	 a	 bid.4	 Also,	 the	




tests	that	we	conduct,	 it	 is	managerial	entrenchment	and	not	price	 improvement	that	actually	
causes	management	 to	 resist	 a	 bid.	 Specifically,	 to	 a	 statistically	 significant	 and	 economically	
meaningful	extent,	a	bid	that	faces	resistance	from	managers	is	associated	with	a	smaller	wealth	
effect,	 lower	 likelihood	 that	 a	 higher	 quality	 offer	will	 be	 realized,	 and	 lower	 likelihood	 that	









There	 are,	 however,	 differences	 in	 approach.	 Cain	 et	 al	 capture	 a	 firm’s	 takeover	 vulnerability	 using	





Our	study	makes	contributions	 to	 two	main	strands	of	 the	 takeover	 literature.	First,	 a	
body	 of	 work	 examines	 whether	 it	 is	 stockholders’	 interests	 or	managerial	 self‐interest	 that	
makes	it	more	likely	that	management	will	resist	a	bid.	Walkling	and	Long	(1984)	and	Cotter	and	










(unlike	 Jennings	 and	Mazzeo	 who	 share	 it	 with	 other	 suspect	 endogenous	 variables	 in	 their	
simultaneous	equations	framework)	and	then	using	this	to	 instrument	 for	the	initial	premium	
(unlike	 Bates	 and	 Becher	 who	 use	 it	 to	 generate,	 and	 base	 their	 conclusions	 on	 only,	 the	
unexplained	part	of	the	initial	premium).	
Second,	an	extensive	body	of	work	examines	antitakeover	provisions,	with	much	of	it	of	





6	 Cain	 et	 al	 (2017)	 examine	 the	 incremental	 effects	 of	 staggered	 takeover	 laws	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	










firm	 is	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 a	 bid	 following	 a	 close	 decision	 by	 shareholders	 to	 rescind	 an	
antitakeover	 provision.7	 Whereas	 these	 studies	 agree	 that	 antitakeover	 provisions	 have	 a	
deterrent	 effect,	 ours	 is	 also	 interested	 in	 the	 effects	 of	 antitakeover	 provisions	 that	 are	
insufficient	to	deter	a	bid	outright.	This	is	because,	whereas	outright	deterrence	is	more	about	





















8	Our	study	of	 the	effects	of	 the	GIM	 index	on	managerial	discretion	 in	 the	event	of	a	bid	complements	
similar	work	on	bidders	by	Masulis,	Wang,	 and	Xie	 (2007)	and	Harford,	Humphery‐Jenner,	 and	Powell	










with	 their	 study,	 upon	 which	 our	 analysis	 builds,	 a	 data	 requirement	 for	 each	 and	 every	
component	of	the	GIM	index	places	the	sample	of	bids	and	firm	years	at	the	intersection	of	the	















more	 than	 one	 year	 and	 then	 also	 including	 failed	 bids.	 However,	 we	 exclude	 management	
buyouts,	whereas	they	do	not,	because,	although	infrequent	in	comparison	to	third‐party	bids,	a	
management	buyout	has	the	potential	to	deter,	or	resist,	a	bid	from	a	third	party	independent	of	





resistance.	The	actions	 taken	by	management	 to	 resist	 a	bid,	post‐announcement,	 range	 from	



























sample	 period	 does	 the	 percentage	 of	 bids	 that	 face	 resistance	 drop	 below	 the	 total	 rate,	
indicating	that	resistance	 is	 far	 from	being	an	 insignificant	 feature	of	more	recent	bids	(a	 fact	
similarly	highlighted	by	Cain	et	al,	2017).		
For	certain,	however,	wider	samples	of	bids	in	terms	of	target	size,	such	as	those	used	by	




	 Our	 analysis	 incorporates	 three	 groups	 of	 variables.	 First,	 there	 are	 variables	 for	 bid	
outcomes	that	could	be	related	to	resistance.	Second,	there	are	variables	for	initial	features	of	a	
bid	 that	could	be	related	 to	resistance.	Third,	 there	are	variables	 for	 the	GIM	 index	and	other	
features	of	a	firm	that	could	be	related	to	not	only	resistance	in	the	event	of	a	bid,	but	also	outright	
bid	deterrence.	Descriptive	statistics	and	difference	in	means	are	presented	in	Table	2	for	all	of	





post‐announcement,	 and	 post‐bid	 returns.	 No	 matter	 the	 abnormal	 return,	 resistance	 is	
seemingly	 associated	 with	 a	 much	 smaller	 wealth	 effect.	 At	 this	 precursory	 stage,	 these	








However,	 our	 univariate	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	 final	 premium	 is	 no	 higher	 in	 the	 face	 of	
resistance.	That	the	final	premium	is	also	no	lower	could	matter	just	the	same	because,	consistent	










2012)	 that	 is	 also	 plausibly	 exogenous	 to	 resistance.	 However,	 the	 statistically	 insignificant	

















In	 Section	 3.1,	 we	 motivate	 use	 of	 the	 two	 variables,	 peers	 GIM	 instrument	 and	 HQ	 GIM	
instrument,	as	strong	sources	of	variation	for	the	GIM	index	that	are	also	plausibly	exogenous	to	
not	 only	bid	deterrence,	 as	Karpoff	 et	 al	 (2017)	 contend,	 but	 also	 resistance.	The	 statistically	
significant	differences	in	the	means	for	these	two	instrumental	variables	suggest	that	there	is	an	
indirect	 trace	 of	 a	 positive	 causal	 relationship	 running	 from	 the	 GIM	 index	 to	 not	 only	 bid	
deterrence,	consistent	with	what	Karpoff	et	al	(2017)	find,	but	also	resistance.	That	is,	on	the	basis	
























the	 presence	 of	 target	 management	 resistance.	 In	 this	 subsection,	 we	 therefore	 examine	 the	
relationship	between	bid	outcomes	and	target	management	resistance	after	having	controlled	for	
these	omitted	variables.	These	multivariate	results	are	presented	in	Table	3.	For	each	of	the	bid	
outcomes,	 the	 multivariate	 result	 for	 the	 relationship	 of	 interest	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	
corresponding	univariate	result.		










reveal	 that	 a	 bid	 is	 30.1	 percentage	 points	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 completed	 in	 the	 face	 of	 target	












The	multivariate	 results	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 do	 not	 align	well	 with	 the	
empirical	assessment	of	Bates	and	Becher	(2017)	that	bid	resistance	is	essentially	motivated	by	
serving	target	shareholders’	interests	and	has	little,	or	nothing,	to	do	with	arising	from	a	position	










One	 explanation	 is	 that	 other	 variables	 that	 differ	 significantly	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 bid	
resistance	 are	 also	 conceivably	 correlated	 with	 the	 target’s	 GIM	 index.	 In	 particular,	 and	




an	 undervalued	 target	 (see	 Malmendier,	 Opp,	 and	 Saidi,	 2016),	 these	 associations	 provide	
potential	 support	 for	 the	 price	 improvement	 hypothesis	 to	 explain	 management	 resistance.9	
Moreover,	 should	 the	 initial	premium	and	an	all	 cash	 initial	offer	be	negatively	and	positively	












Another	 explanation	 is	 that	 neither	 the	 multivariate	 result	 nor	 the	 corresponding	
univariate	result	correctly	captures	the	relationship	between	bid	resistance	and	the	target’s	GIM	
index.	This	concern	arises	from	the	possibility	of	reverse	causality	in	that	the	target’s	GIM	index	










	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 address	 these	 endogeneity	 concerns,	we	 therefore	 next	 examine	 the	
relationship	between	bid	resistance	and	the	target’s	GIM	index	after	having	instrumented	for	the	
suspect	 endogenous	 variable,	 using	 the	 target’s	 peers	 and	 HQ	 GIM	 indexes	 as	 instrumental	
variables.	The	first	and	second	stages	that	comprise	these	IV	linear	probability	regression	results	
are	presented	in	Columns	(2)	and	(3),	respectively,	of	Table	4.		
The	 first	 stage	 results,	 after	 having	 regressed	 the	 target’s	 GIM	 index	 on	 the	 two	
instrumental	variables	and	the	other	variables	included	in	the	second	stage,	reveal	that	both	of	

























target’s	 GIM	 index	 are	 sufficiently	 exogenous	 as	 to	 not	 result	 in	 the	 IV	 linear	 probability	
regression	being	over‐identified.			
The	average	marginal	effects	for	the	target’s	peers	and	HQ	GIM	indexes	are	after	having	




















The	 second	 stage	 results,	 after	 having	 regressed	 bid	 resistance	 on	 the	 target’s	
instrumented	 GIM	 index	 and	 the	 other	 variables	 included	 in	 the	 ordinary	 linear	 probability	
regression,	reveal	that	raising	the	target’s	instrumented	GIM	index	by	one	point	(which	equates	
to	 the	 target	 having	 an	 extra	 defense	 from	 the	 GIM	 index	 arsenal)	 is	 predicted	 to	 make	 bid	
resistance	5.9	percentage	points	more	likely.	Given	the	total	percentage	of	resisted	bids	presented	




By	way	of	comparison	with	 the	corresponding	average	marginal	effect	 in	 the	ordinary	













of	 management	 resistance	 in	 the	 actual	 event	 of	 a	 bid.	 If	 so,	 this	 finding	 suggests	 that	 bid	
resistance	arises	 from	a	position	of	management	entrenchment,	and	does	not	 substitute	 for	a	
lower	 GIM	 index	 by	 possibly	 affording	 target	 management	 more	 bargaining	 power	 for	 price	
improvement.	Given	the	plausibility	 for	the	target’s	 instrumented	GIM	index	being	sufficiently	
pre‐determined	with	respect	to	the	likelihood	of	bid	resistance,	we	go	as	far	as	to	suggest	that	a	
higher	GIM	index	actually	causes	bid	resistance	to	be	more	 likely.	That	 is,	 to	 the	extent	 that	a	
higher	GIM	index	is	a	direct,	ex‐ante	proxy	for	management	entrenchment,	bid	resistance	is	likely	
motivated	by	target	management	entrenchment.	






However,	 average	marginal	 effects	 estimated	 using	 ordinary	 and	 IV	 linear	 probability	
regressions	might	not	be	 reliable	when	generated	 in	 the	context	of	 a	dichotomous	dependent	




















order	 to	 attract	 competing	 bidders,	 or	 strengthen	 its	 bargaining	 position.	 Fishman	 (1988)	
theorizes	that	such	a	scenario	is	more	likely	the	greater	is	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	

















	 As	 a	 solution	 to	 this	 problem	 (suggested	 by	Wooldridge,	 2010,	 pp.	 809‐813),	 we	 re‐
estimate	the	IV	probit	regression	in	reduced	form,	generate	the	bid	lambda,	and	include	it	as	an	











years	 before	 it	 could	 have	 plausibly	 been	 influenced	 by	 aspects	 of	 the	 bids	 in	 our	 sample.13	
Furthermore,	we	bootstrap	standard	errors	in	the	final,	IV	linear	probability,	regression	because	
of	manual	adding	of	the	bid	lambda.14	
	 Even	with	 the	 addition	 of	 an	 exclusion	 restriction,	 the	 results	 from	 the	 reduced	 form	
regression	are	consistent	with	those	for	the	IV	probit	regression,	and	the	reduced	form	results	of	















































of	being	exogenous	sources	of	variation	 for	 the	suspect	endogenous	variable.	However,	 in	 the	
event	 of	 both	 failing	 to	 rule	 out	 endogeneity	 and	 finding	 a	 strong	 relationship	 between	 the	
outcome	variable	and	instrumented	variable,	Angrist	and	Pischke	(2009,	p.	213)	suggest	that	it	
would	be	out	of	the	ordinary	were	a	trace	of	this	direct	relationship	not	to	be	discernible	in	the	










GIM	 instrument	 was	 also	 shown	 to	 be	 statistically	 significant,	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 over‐
                                                            
15	 Bates	 and	 Becher	 (2017)	 account	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 classified	 board,	 only	 one	 of	 24	 components	
comprising	 the	 GIM	 index,	 but,	 unlike	 Bates,	 Becher,	 and	 Lemmon	 (2008)	 and	Amihud	 et	 al	 (2017)	 in	









identification	 was	 categorically	 ruled	 out.	 A	 similar	 trace	 of	 the	 direct	 relationship	 between	
resistance	and	the	instrumented	GIM	index	is	also	evident	in	the	reduced	form	results	in	Column	




















We	 therefore	 repeat	 the	 preceding	 analysis	 using	 fixed,	 instead	 of	 rolling,	 GIM	
instruments.	The	results,	presented	in	Table	7,	provide	evidence	in	further	support	of	a	positive	
causal	relationship	running	from	the	GIM	index	to	resistance	in	so	far	as	the	causal	relationship	










perhaps,	 just	as	arbitrary	substitute	 for	equal	weights	 in	 the	summation.	Second,	a	GIM	 index	
above	a	certain	(so‐called	‘dictatorship’)	threshold	could	be	just	as	potent	as	one	higher	up	in	the	
distribution	(see	Gompers	et	al,	2003).	Third,	 these	measurement	 issues	could	be	particularly	





GIM	dictatorship,	we	 substitute	 the	 IV	 regressions	used	previously	 for	otherwise	 identical	bi‐
probit	regressions.	However,	here,	the	bid	lambda	is	unchanged	from	that	generated	previously	
in	reduced	form,	using	rolling	or	fixed	GIM	instruments.	The	results,	presented	in	Table	8,	provide	




























particular	 sub‐index,	 and	 hence	 an	 unreliable	 test	 of	 endogeneity,	 as	 compared	 to	 when	
predicting	a	bid.		
While	 there	might	 not	 be	 to	 be	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 BCF	 index	 and	 the	
likelihood	 of	 management	 resistance,	 both	 sub‐indices	 matter	 for	 outright,	 bid	 deterrence	
(consistent	with	the	findings	of	Karpoff	et	al,	2017),	and	the	deterrent	effect	of	a	higher,	BCF	index	
is	unrelated	to	the	cost	of	acquiring	information	about	a	firm.	These	findings	therefore	support	
the	 claim	 by	 Bebchuk	 et	 al	 (2009)	 that	 their	 index	 quantifies	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 a	 firm’s	


















































(1993),	 for	 the	price	 improvement	hypothesis	when	predicting	 resistance	using	 the	observed	
initial	premium	(see	Walkling	and	Long,	1984;	Cotter	and	Zenner,	1994;	Bates	and	Becher,	2017).	
However,	 Bates	 and	 Becher	 (2017)	 contend	 that	 the	 unexplained	 or	 abnormal	 part	 of	 the	
observed	initial	premium	represents	a	better	proxy	for	the	perceived	quality	of	a	bid.	They	find	
support	 for	 the	 price	 improvement	 hypothesis	 only	 after	 substituting	 this	 measure	 for	 the	





and	 bid	 lambda	 (from	 before)	 ensures	 that	 any	 endogenous	 co‐determination	 and	 sample	
selection	bias	are	dealt	with	in	the	same	way	in	the	standalone	regression	in	Column	(1)	for	the	












instruments,	 and	 bid	 lambda,	 it	 is	 less	 conceivable	 that	 the	 nominal	 ratio	 of	 past	 prices	 is	
correlated	 to	 a	 problematic	 degree	with	 unobservable	 factors	 also	 related	 to	 resistance.	 Like	
Baker	et	al	(2012)	and	Bates	and	Becher	(2017),	it	is	also	evident	from	our	results	that	all	other	




following	 greater	 protection	 from	 State	 antitakeover	 laws	 and	 Cuñat	 et	 al	 (2017)	 following	
removal	of	a	defense	from	the	corporate	charter.	
The	results	 for	 the	second	stage	of	 the	 IV	regression	 in	Column	(3)	show	that	 like	 the	












premium	 and	 resistance.	 Moreover,	 a	 statistically	 significant	 effect	 for	 the	 abnormal	 initial	






al	 (2012)	 variable,	 pre‐bid	 price	 to	 high	 price,	 which	 in	 the	 prior	 non‐instrumented	 context	
served	only	as	an	exclusion	restriction.	The	results	for	the	second	stage	of	this	again	otherwise	
identical	 IV	 regression	 in	 Column	 (7)	 provide	 strong	 statistical	 support	 against	 there	 being	 a	
negative,	or	any,	causal	 relationship	running	 from	the	observed	 initial	premium	to	resistance,	
including	those	from	the	tests	of	 instrument	validity	and	the	need	for	an	exogenous	source	of	
variation	 for	 the	 observed	 initial	 premium.18	 Furthermore,	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 co‐
determination	from	the	instruments	in	the	first	stages	for	the	observed	initial	premium	and	GIM	
index	in	Columns	(1)	and	(6)	respectively.	That	is,	no	matter	the	direction,	there	is	no	trace	of	a	
direct	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 GIM	 index	 and	 observed	 initial	 premium.	 Lastly,	 the	
reduced	form	results	in	Column	(8)	for	the	same	IV	regression	accord	with	the	main	results	in	
revealing	no	 statistical	 trace	 of	 a	 direct	 causal	 relationship	 running	 from	 the	 observed	 initial	
premium	to	resistance.	This	reduced	form	result	is	consistent	with	the	corresponding	univariate	
result	in	Section	2.2.	






observed	 initial	 premium	and	 resistance.	However,	 the	 only	 variable	 that	 Jennings	 and	Mazzeo	 (1993)	
include	in	the	simultaneous	regression	for	the	observed	initial	premium,	number	of	analysts	following	the	
target,	is	also	included	in	the	simultaneous	regression	for	predicting	resistance.	Moreover,	this	variable	is	



















entrenchment	 causes	managers	 to	 resist	 a	 bid,	 rather	 than	 that	 the	motive	 for	 management	
resistance	is	to	compensate	for	a	lower	GIM	index.		
As	 a	 more	 head‐on	 test	 of	 the	 latter,	 price	 improvement	 motive,	 we	 jointly	 examine	
whether	 there	 is	 a	 causal	 relationship	 that	 runs	 from	 the	 initial	premium	 to	 the	 likelihood	of	
management	resistance.	With	a	source	of	variation	for	the	initial	premium	that	also	has	strong	













resist	 the	bid.	 In	 contrast,	 outright	 bid	deterrence	 is	more	 about	 the	discretion	of	 a	 potential	
bidder.		




sizable	dataset	with	many	control	variables	 from	which	 it	 is	clearly	evident	 that	management	
resistance	matters	more	for	larger	firms,	the	evidence	that	we	present	in	this	paper	is	likely	to	be	














Bids	 are	 dropped	 that	 are	 not	 an	 attempt	 to	 acquire	 in	 excess	 of	 fifty	
percent	 of	 a	 firm’s	 outstanding,	 common	 stock,	 bids	 are	 also	 dropped	
when	made	 by	management,	 and	 bids	 for	 the	 same	 firm	 are	 combined	
when	separated	by	up	to	260,	trading	days.	
Announcement	return	 Wealth	 effect	 for	 shareholders	 through	 to	 bid	 announcement,	 which	
(having	combined	bids	for	the	same	firm	when	separated	by	up	to	260,	
trading	 days)	 is	 the	 target	 firm’s	 stock	 return	 for	 the	 42,	 trading	 days	
before	 bid	 announcement	 (run‐up	 period),	 and	 through	 to	 bid	
announcement,	net	of	 the	stock	return	for	a	value‐weighted	 index	of	all	


















Termination	fee	 Indicator	 for	 management	 commitment	 to	 closing	 out	 a	 bid	 with	 a	






antitakeover	 provision	 that	 a	 firm	 has	 out	 of	 twenty‐four	 –	 including	

















focus	 firm,	 and	 firms	 with	 a	 historic,	 two‐digit,	 Standard	 Industrial	
Classification	(SIC)	code	that	is	the	same	as	that	of	the	focus	firm,	have	a	
start	year	in	the	CCM	database,	after	having	combined	start	years	earlier	
than	1951,	 that	 is	 the	 same	as	 that	 of	 the	 focus	 firm.	This	pseudo,	GIM	
index	 is	 constructed	 in	 a	 similar	 way	 to	 that	 described	 by	 Karpoff,	
Schonlau,	and	Wehrly	(2017).	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 Pseudo,	GIM	index	for	headquarters‐proximate	(HQ)	firms,	which	does	the	
same	as	 the	peers,	GIM	 index	(rolling),	but	 for	cohort	 firms	that	have	a	
Zone	Improvement	Plan	code	in	the	CCM	database	for	which	the	latitude	
and	 longitude	co‐ordinates	 locate	their	headquarters	within	a	100	mile,	
same	 State,	 radius	 of	 that	 of	 the	 focus	 firm.	 This	 pseudo,	 GIM	 index	 is	
constructed	in	a	similar	way	to	that	also	described	by	Karpoff	et	al	(2017).	
Initial	premium	 Actual	premium	offered	by	the	initial	bidder,	which	does	the	same	as	the	
































Stock	return	 Return	on	a	 firm’s	stock,	which,	with	a	 lag	of	one	year,	 is	a	 firm’s	stock	
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are	 those	 that	 have	 a	 historic,	 two‐digit,	 Standard	 Industrial	 Classification	 code	 for	 either	 a	 financial	
industry	(including	real‐estate),	or	a	regulated	utility	industry.	The	final,	unbalanced	panel	of	firm	years	for	
1993‐2012,	with	a	 lag	of	one	year	 for	the	other	variables	(including	the	actual,	GIM	 index)	that	are	not	
conditional	 on	 a	 bid,	 is	merged	with	 bids	 in	 the	 Securities	Data	 Company	 Platinum	database.	 Bids	 are	
dropped	that	are	not	an	attempt	to	acquire	in	excess	of	fifty	percent	of	a	firm’s	outstanding,	common	stock,	
bids	 are	 also	 dropped	 when	 made	 by	 management,	 and	 bids	 for	 the	 same	 firm	 are	 combined	 when	
separated	by	up	 to	 260,	 trading	days.	 Column	 (1)	 is	 the	 annual	 number	 of	 bids	 that	 face	management	
resistance,	Column	(2)	is	the	annual	number	of	bids,	and	Column	(3)	is	the	annual	percentage	of	bids	that	
face	management	 resistance.	 Column	 (4)	 is	 the	 annual	 number	 of	 firms,	 and	Column	 (5)	 is	 the	 annual	
percentage	of	firms	that	are	the	target	of	a	bid.										
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Year	 Resistance	#	 Bids	#	 Resistance	%	 Firms	#	 Target	firms	%	
1993	 3	 9	 33.3	 753	 1.2	
1994	 5	 22	 22.7	 854	 2.6	
1995	 10	 33	 30.3	 845	 3.9	
1996	 10	 36	 27.8	 899	 4.0	
1997	 10	 50	 20.0	 876	 5.7	
1998	 6	 55	 10.9	 873	 6.3	
1999	 15	 103	 14.6	 1,192	 8.6	
2000	 9	 88	 10.2	 1,068	 8.2	
2001	 4	 43	 9.3	 1,052	 4.1	
2002	 3	 17	 17.7	 1,008	 1.7	
2003	 4	 30	 13.3	 1,264	 2.4	
2004	 10	 43	 23.3	 1,243	 3.5	
2005	 15	 79	 19.0	 1,344	 5.9	
2006	 11	 72	 15.3	 1,278	 5.6	
2007	 11	 93	 11.8	 1,304	 7.1	
2008	 19	 52	 36.5	 1,203	 4.3	
2009	 5	 41	 12.2	 1,134	 3.6	
2010	 7	 38	 18.4	 1,099	 3.5	
2011	 10	 44	 22.7	 1,064	 4.1	
2012	 6	 47	 12.8	 1,022	 4.6	




















	 Resistance	 No	resistance	 	 Bid	 No	bid	 	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	
Variable	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Obs	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Obs	
Announcement	return	 0.130***	 0.252	 0.220	 0.249	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Post‐announcement	return	 0.195***	 0.224	 0.256	 0.244	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Post‐bid	return	 0.181***	 0.549	 0.270	 0.319	 985	 	 	 	 	 	
Final	premium	 0.479	 0.369	 0.442	 0.373	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Completed	 0.642***	 	 0.946	 	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Termination	fee	 0.503***	 	 0.876	 	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
GIM	index	 9.376**	 2.436	 8.878	 2.635	 995	 8.965	 2.607	 9.037	 2.687	 21,375	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 9.115***	 1.100	 8.787	 1.079	 992	 8.844***	 1.089	 9.020	 1.103	 21,249	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 9.082*	 0.926	 8.927	 0.945	 976	 8.954***	 0.943	 9.064	 0.919	 21,053	
Initial	premium	 0.341***	 0.304	 0.438	 0.371	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Pre‐bid	price	to	high	price	 ‐0.244	 0.203	 ‐0.245	 0.202	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
All	cash	 0.566***	 	 0.454	 	 995	 	 	 	 	 	
Size	 3,237.3	 6,350.0	 2,548.8	 6,254.3	 993	 2,668.8***	 6,273.3	 5,791.8	 24,009.3	 21,361	
Leverage	 0.198	 0.162	 0.184	 0.179	 992	 0.187	 0.176	 0.179	 0.157	 21,358	
Market‐to‐book	 1.539***	 0.795	 1.780	 0.979	 987	 1.738***	 0.954	 1.943	 1.374	 21,340	






	 Resistance	 No	resistance	 	 Bid	 No	bid	 	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	
Variable	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Obs	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Mean	 Std	dev.	 Obs	
Liquidity	 0.196**	 0.187	 0.236	 0.211	 993	 0.229	 0.207	 0.225	 0.201	 21,361	
Sales	growth	 0.023	 0.164	 0.161	 2.282	 993	 0.137**	 2.076	 0.085	 0.659	 21,333	
ROA	 0.109	 0.099	 0.115	 0.159	 983	 0.114***	 0.150	 0.134	 0.109	 21,296	
Stock	return	 ‐0.114	 0.445	 ‐0.116	 0.450	 995	 ‐0.115***	 0.448	 ‐0.024	 0.429	 21,358	













the	marginal	effects.	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.       	
	 Linear	 Probit	






return	 Post‐bid	return	 Final	premium	 Completed	 Termination	fee	
Resistance	 ‐0.0929***	 ‐0.0642***	 ‐0.0888**	 0.0471	 ‐0.3006***	 ‐0.3476***	
	 (0.0217)	 (0.0198)	 (0.0436)	 (0.0317)	 (0.0363)	 (0.0396)	
GIM	index	 ‐0.0021	 0.0013	 0.0028	 0.0015	 ‐0.0030	 ‐0.0025	
	 (0.0031)	 (0.0030)	 (0.0047)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0034)	 (0.0043)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 	 	 0.1663***	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.0360)	
Final	premium	 	 	 	 	 0.1813***	 	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.0311)	 	
All	cash	 0.0387**	 0.0447***	 ‐0.0013	 ‐0.0249	 ‐0.0232	 ‐0.0065	
	 (0.0170)	 (0.0166)	 (0.0267)	 (0.0265)	 (0.0187)	 (0.0242)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0084	 ‐0.0124*	 ‐0.0104	 ‐0.0182	 ‐0.0083	 0.0163*	
	 (0.0071)	 (0.0072)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0112)	 (0.0070)	 (0.0097)	
Leverage	 0.1383**	 0.1520***	 0.0384	 0.1396*	 ‐0.0712	 0.0545	
	 (0.0536)	 (0.0493)	 (0.0958)	 (0.0752)	 (0.0556)	 (0.0777)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0130	 ‐0.0168	 ‐0.0126	 ‐0.0154	 0.0160	 0.0171	
	 (0.0116)	 (0.0113)	 (0.0132)	 (0.0155)	 (0.0138)	 (0.0166)	
Tangibility	 ‐0.0649**	 ‐0.0654**	 ‐0.0103	 ‐0.0970***	 0.0556**	 0.0176	
	 (0.0271)	 (0.0254)	 (0.0431)	 (0.0374)	 (0.0272)	 (0.0330)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0840	 ‐0.0401	 ‐0.0014	 ‐0.0696	 0.0221	 0.0133	












return	 Post‐bid	return	 Final	premium	 Completed	 Termination	fee	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0099***	 ‐0.0115***	 ‐0.0120***	 ‐0.0087***	 0.0019	 0.0042	
	 (0.0011)	 (0.0011)	 (0.0015)	 (0.0016)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0031)	
ROA	 0.1758	 0.1364	 0.2445	 0.0521	 ‐0.0104	 0.0777	
	 (0.1391)	 (0.1279)	 (0.1855)	 (0.1754)	 (0.0791)	 (0.1064)	
Stock	return	 ‐0.0676**	 ‐0.0571**	 ‐0.0676*	 ‐0.1321***	 0.0047	 0.0174	
	 (0.0272)	 (0.0275)	 (0.0373)	 (0.0456)	 (0.0235)	 (0.0297)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.1156	 ‐0.0908	 ‐0.1718	 ‐0.0632	 0.0437	 ‐0.5143***	
	 (0.0962)	 (0.0912)	 (0.1406)	 (0.1617)	 (0.1324)	 (0.1495)	
Constant	 0.3131***	 0.3421***	 0.3178***	 0.6152***	 0.8942***	 0.8121***	
	 (0.0720)	 (0.0723)	 (0.0896)	 (0.1111)	 (0.0087)	 (0.0113)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 21.3***	 25.6***	 19.9***	 5.1***	 	 	
Chi2	 	 	 	 	 134.3***	 139.8***	
R2	%	 6.4	 6.0	 2.4	 4.7	 	 	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 	 23.5	 15.7	















denote	statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.         	
	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Probit	 IV,	probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 0.0062	 	 0.0585***	 0.0065	 	 0.0554***	
	 (0.0046)	 	 (0.0192)	 (0.0045)	 	 (0.0179)	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 	 0.5958***	 	 	 0.5944***	 	
	 	 (0.0743)	 	 	 (0.0731)	 	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 	 0.2778**	 	 	 0.2812***	 	
	 	 (0.1090)	 	 	 (0.1061)	 	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0961***	 0.0791	 ‐0.0939***	 ‐0.1052***	 0.0791	 ‐0.1004***	
	 (0.0308)	 (0.2061)	 (0.0323)	 (0.0359)	 (0.2046)	 (0.0360)	
All	cash	 0.0797***	 ‐0.0757	 0.0881***	 0.0803***	 ‐0.0755	 0.0847***	
	 (0.0258)	 (0.1613)	 (0.0272)	 (0.0256)	 (0.1602)	 (0.0255)	
ln[Size]	 0.0176	 0.3261***	 ‐0.0054	 0.0171*	 0.3264***	 0.0118	
	 (0.0109)	 (0.0650)	 (0.0136)	 (0.0102)	 (0.0645)	 (0.0116)	
Leverage	 0.0224	 0.7007	 ‐0.0362	 0.0334	 0.6997	 0.0125	
	 (0.0742)	 (0.4972)	 (0.0793)	 (0.0749)	 (0.4938)	 (0.0756)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0266*	 ‐0.0780	 ‐0.0160	 ‐0.0328	 ‐0.0777	 ‐0.0241	
	 (0.0136)	 (0.0901)	 (0.0147)	 (0.0213)	 (0.0894)	 (0.0195)	
Tangibility	 0.0510	 ‐0.1117	 0.0476	 0.0409	 ‐0.1119	 0.0308	








	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Probit	 IV,	probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0561	 ‐0.5020	 ‐0.0285	 ‐0.0661	 ‐0.5017	 ‐0.0694	
	 (0.0683)	 (0.4543)	 (0.0735)	 (0.0685)	 (0.4512)	 (0.0685)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0029*	 ‐0.0083	 ‐0.0017	 ‐0.1019**	 ‐0.0082	 ‐0.1072**	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0104)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0511)	 (0.0103)	 (0.0530)	
ROA	 ‐0.1462	 ‐1.4634**	 ‐0.1041	 ‐0.0838	 ‐1.4680**	 ‐0.1264	
	 (0.1086)	 (0.6825)	 (0.1140)	 (0.1118)	 (0.6773)	 (0.1109)	
Stock	return	 0.0059	 0.2404	 ‐0.0069	 0.0148	 0.2404	 0.0151	
	 (0.0304)	 (0.1971)	 (0.0323)	 (0.0319)	 (0.1958)	 (0.0323)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2028	 ‐1.4295	 ‐0.0815	 ‐0.2111	 ‐1.4295	 ‐0.1531	
	 (0.1613)	 (1.1285)	 (0.1745)	 (0.1795)	 (1.1206)	 (0.1793)	
Constant	 0.0669	 ‐0.4913	 ‐0.2843*	 0.1743***	 ‐0.5106	 0.1707***	
	 (0.0995)	 (1.2062)	 (0.1631)	 (0.0119)	 (1.1922)	 (0.0219)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 4.7***	 	 	 	 	 	
Chi2	 	 57.7***	 41.3***	 77.4***	
R2	%	 4.0	 	 	 	 	 	
Pseudo	R2	%	 	 	 	 5.0	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 38.3***	 	 	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)		 	 7.8	 	 	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 0.1	 	 	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 8.6***	 	 8.5***	





















	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 	 ‐0.0081***	 	 	 0.0480**	 	 0.0465**	
	 	 (0.0024)	 	 	 (0.0209)	 	 (0.0195)	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.5706***	 	 ‐0.0033**	 0.5641***	 	 0.5651***	 	
	 (0.0527)	 	 (0.0014)	 (0.0753)	 	 (0.0740)	 	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.3198***	 	 ‐0.0044***	 0.2351**	 	 0.2320**	 	
	 (0.0607)	 	 (0.0016)	 (0.1110)	 	 (0.1096)	 	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 0.0616	 ‐0.0957***	 0.0615	 ‐0.1071***	
	 	 	 	 (0.2063)	 (0.0314)	 (0.2048)	 (0.0347)	
All	cash	 	 	 	 ‐0.0758	 0.0875***	 ‐0.0759	 0.0848***	
	 	 	 	 (0.1608)	 (0.0266)	 (0.1596)	 (0.0252)	
ln[Size]	 0.1335***	 ‐0.0105***	 ‐0.0104***	 0.2336***	 ‐0.0157	 0.2332***	 ‐0.0061	
	 (0.0475)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0781)	 (0.0131)	 (0.0774)	 (0.0117)	
Leverage	 0.5312	 0.0189*	 0.0215**	 0.9522*	 0.0083	 0.9538*	 0.0635	







	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0832**	 ‐0.0079***	 ‐0.0080***	 ‐0.1229	 ‐0.0233	 ‐0.1233	 ‐0.0309	
	 (0.0341)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0924)	 (0.0154)	 (0.0916)	 (0.0195)	
Tangibility	 0.1808	 ‐0.0053	 ‐0.0051	 ‐0.1473	 0.0408	 ‐0.1471	 0.0249	
	 (0.1633)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.2339)	 (0.0351)	 (0.2321)	 (0.0316)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.8410***	 ‐0.0297***	 ‐0.0328***	 ‐0.7617	 ‐0.0729	 ‐0.7627*	 ‐0.1203*	
	 (0.2951)	 (0.0092)	 (0.0089)	 (0.4642)	 (0.0757)	 (0.4609)	 (0.0713)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0323**	 0.0017	 0.0017	 ‐0.0002	 ‐0.0005	 ‐0.0003	 ‐0.0922*	
	 (0.0157)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0107)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0106)	 (0.0515)	
ROA	 0.0813	 ‐0.0178	 ‐0.0154	 ‐1.4058**	 ‐0.1157	 ‐1.4014**	 ‐0.1338	
	 (0.3770)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0153)	 (0.6797)	 (0.1110)	 (0.6748)	 (0.1070)	
Stock	return	 0.1882***	 ‐0.0034	 ‐0.0030	 0.1189	 ‐0.0228	 0.1185	 ‐0.0094	
	 (0.0451)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.2039)	 (0.0325)	 (0.2026)	 (0.0325)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐1.0931*	 ‐0.0562***	 ‐0.0588***	 ‐1.8970*	 ‐0.1676	 ‐1.8983*	 ‐0.2560	
	 (0.5868)	 (0.0200)	 (0.0192)	 (1.1406)	 (0.1736)	 (1.1327)	 (0.1829)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 0.0396***	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.0121)	 	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.9662**	 0.1467*	 0.9688**	 0.1857**	
	 	 	 	 (0.4790)	 (0.0795)	 (0.4756)	 (0.0729)	
Constant	 0.3344	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 ‐0.9989	 ‐0.3870**	 ‐0.9818	 0.1707***	
	 (0.7539)	 (0.0025)	 (0.0014)	 (1.2239)	 (0.1615)	 (1.2189)	 (0.0211)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Chi2	 355.5***	 365.2***	 66.2***	 77.1***	
Pseudo	R2	%	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 	 	 31.5***	 	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 	 	 6.4	 	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 0.0	 	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 15.4***	 	 4.8**	 5.0**	
















the	 rolling	 instruments,	 only,	 for	 the	GIM	 index	 (indirect,	 causal	 relationship),	 and	 the	other	 variables.	
Column	(4)	does	the	same	as	Columns	(6)	and	(7)	of	Table	5,	but	in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	rolling	instruments,	only,	for	the	GIM	index	(indirect,	causal	





	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Variables	 Resistance	 Resistance	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.0333***	 0.0269**	 0.0323***	 0.0269**	
	 (0.0116)	 (0.0119)	 (0.0110)	 (0.0113)	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.0201	 0.0116	 0.0170	 0.0091	
	 (0.0135)	 (0.0139)	 (0.0132)	 (0.0135)	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0892***	 ‐0.0927***	 ‐0.0996***	 ‐0.1068***	
	 (0.0310)	 (0.0305)	 (0.0360)	 (0.0346)	
All	cash	 0.0839***	 0.0839***	 0.0841***	 0.0842***	
	 (0.0259)	 (0.0257)	 (0.0255)	 (0.0252)	
ln[Size]	 0.0140	 ‐0.0045	 0.0132	 ‐0.0055	
	 (0.0108)	 (0.0120)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0113)	
Leverage	 0.0036	 0.0538	 0.0147	 0.0671	
	 (0.0734)	 (0.0745)	 (0.0745)	 (0.0747)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0202	 ‐0.0292**	 ‐0.0241	 ‐0.0314*	
	 (0.0131)	 (0.0138)	 (0.0192)	 (0.0190)	
Tangibility	 0.0408	 0.0337	 0.0304	 0.0247	
	 (0.0336)	 (0.0337)	 (0.0317)	 (0.0317)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0575	 ‐0.1093	 ‐0.0710	 ‐0.1229*	
	 (0.0686)	 (0.0701)	 (0.0680)	 (0.0693)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0021	 ‐0.0005	 ‐0.1065**	 ‐0.0920*	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0528)	 (0.0514)	
ROA	 ‐0.1950*	 ‐0.1835*	 ‐0.1360	 ‐0.1378	
	 (0.1130)	 (0.1109)	 (0.1139)	 (0.1097)	
Stock	return	 0.0072	 ‐0.0171	 0.0159	 ‐0.0091	
	 (0.0301)	 (0.0316)	 (0.0320)	 (0.0326)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.1651	 ‐0.2584	 ‐0.1550	 ‐0.2584	
	 (0.1621)	 (0.1603)	 (0.1770)	 (0.1786)	
Bid	lambda	 	 0.1928***	 	 0.1892***	
	 	 (0.0711)	 	 (0.0681)	
Constant	 ‐0.3353*	 ‐0.4366**	 0.1708***	 0.1708***	
	 (0.1745)	 (0.1773)	 (0.0119)	 (0.0118)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	




Causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 antitakeover	 provisions	 and	 the	
likelihood	of	management	resistance:	effects	in	reduced	form 
	 Linear	prob.	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Variables	 Resistance	 Resistance	 Resistance	 Resistance	
F	 5.0***	 5.2***	 	 	
Chi2	 	 	 53.5***	 59.4***	
R2	%	 4.9	 5.6	 	 	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 6.1	 6.9	




Causal	relationship	between	 the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	 (GIM	 index)	and	 the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance:	 fixed	
instruments	for	the	GIM	index		






and	(2),	but	 in	reduced	form,	by	probit	regressing	 the	 likelihood	of	a	bid	on	the	 fixed	 instruments,	only,	 for	the	GIM	index,	and	the	other	variables	 that	are	not	











	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 	 ‐0.0073***	 	 	 0.0421**	 	 	 0.0402**	 	
	 	 (0.0022)	 	 	 (0.0190)	 	 	 (0.0180)	 	
Peers,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 0.6740***	 	 ‐0.0040***	 0.6380***	 	 0.0248*	 0.6355***	 	 0.0241**	
	 (0.0590)	 	 (0.0015)	 (0.0831)	 	 (0.0128)	 (0.0827)	 	 (0.0122)	
HQ,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 0.3915***	 	 ‐0.0038**	 0.3151***	 	 0.0190	 0.3215***	 	 0.0170	
	 (0.0682)	 	 (0.0018)	 (0.1023)	 	 (0.0156)	 (0.0996)	 	 (0.0155)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 0.0777	 ‐0.0956***	 ‐0.0920***	 0.0781	 ‐0.1060***	 ‐0.1050***	
	 	 	 	 (0.2071)	 (0.0311)	 (0.0305)	 (0.2056)	 (0.0346)	 (0.0346)	
All	cash	 	 	 	 ‐0.0857	 0.0871***	 0.0837***	 ‐0.0854	 0.0840***	 0.0836***	





Causal	relationship	between	 the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	 (GIM	 index)	and	 the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance:	 fixed	
instruments	for	the	GIM	index 
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
ln[Size]	 0.1033**	 ‐0.0104***	 ‐0.0102***	 0.2245***	 ‐0.0141	 ‐0.0041	 0.2252***	 ‐0.0060	 ‐0.0047	
	 (0.0480)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0768)	 (0.0129)	 (0.0120)	 (0.0762)	 (0.0117)	 (0.0113)	
Leverage	 0.5224	 0.0190*	 0.0213**	 0.9198*	 0.0141	 0.0501	 0.9166*	 0.0628	 0.0635	
	 (0.3239)	 (0.0102)	 (0.0102)	 (0.5090)	 (0.0802)	 (0.0746)	 (0.5054)	 (0.0773)	 (0.0748)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0711**	 ‐0.0079***	 ‐0.0080***	 ‐0.1138	 ‐0.0246	 ‐0.0290**	 ‐0.1134	 ‐0.0300	 ‐0.0297	
	 (0.0337)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0916)	 (0.0150)	 (0.0140)	 (0.0909)	 (0.0198)	 (0.0194)	
Tangibility	 0.1357	 ‐0.0050	 ‐0.0050	 ‐0.2111	 0.0410	 0.0321	 ‐0.2111	 0.0241	 0.0237	
	 (0.1631)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.2304)	 (0.0347)	 (0.0338)	 (0.2287)	 (0.0317)	 (0.0318)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.8501***	 ‐0.0295***	 ‐0.0324***	 ‐0.8393*	 ‐0.0782	 ‐0.1117	 ‐0.8373*	 ‐0.1226*	 ‐0.1234*	
	 (0.2921)	 (0.0091)	 (0.0089)	 (0.4637)	 (0.0745)	 (0.0699)	 (0.4602)	 (0.0712)	 (0.0693)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0225	 0.0016	 0.0016	 0.0056	 ‐0.0006	 ‐0.0003	 0.0057	 ‐0.0945*	 ‐0.0935*	
	 (0.0137)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0105)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0104)	 (0.0519)	 (0.0518)	
ROA	 0.0236	 ‐0.0175	 ‐0.0167	 ‐1.5325**	 ‐0.1198	 ‐0.1899*	 ‐1.5388**	 ‐0.1344	 ‐0.1449	
	 (0.3753)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0152)	 (0.6677)	 (0.1099)	 (0.1095)	 (0.6623)	 (0.1070)	 (0.1095)	
Stock	return	 0.1706***	 ‐0.0034	 ‐0.0030	 0.1618	 ‐0.0217	 ‐0.0144	 0.1624	 ‐0.0076	 ‐0.0069	
	 (0.0447)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.2043)	 (0.0321)	 (0.0316)	 (0.2029)	 (0.0325)	 (0.0325)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐1.1059*	 ‐0.0563***	 ‐0.0590***	 ‐1.8876*	 ‐0.1809	 ‐0.2598	 ‐1.8870*	 ‐0.2548	 ‐0.2582	
	 (0.5854)	 (0.0199)	 (0.0192)	 (1.1098)	 (0.1705)	 (0.1597)	 (1.1014)	 (0.1822)	 (0.1777)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 0.0397***	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.0121)	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.9528**	 0.1539*	 0.1909***	 0.9493**	 0.1875**	 0.1877***	
	 	 	 	 (0.4720)	 (0.0788)	 (0.0712)	 (0.4682)	 (0.0736)	 (0.0684)	
Constant	 ‐1.0611	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 ‐2.2232*	 ‐0.3561**	 ‐0.4805***	 ‐2.2573**	 0.1708***	 0.1708***	
	 (0.8272)	 (0.0022)	 (0.0014)	 (1.1648)	 (0.1511)	 (0.1825)	 (1.1489)	 (0.0187)	 (0.0118)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 	 	 	 	 	 5.1***	 	 	 	




Causal	relationship	between	 the	extent	of	 the	 target	 firm’s	antitakeover	provisions	 (GIM	 index)	and	 the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance:	 fixed	
instruments	for	the	GIM	index 
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 GIM	index	 Bid	 Bid	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
R2	%	 	 	 	 	 	 5.6	 	 	 	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	 	 	 6.8	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 	 	 37.1***	 	 	 	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 	 	 7.3	 	 	 	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 0.2	 	 	 	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 15.7***	 	 4.3**	 	 4.1**	 	



























	 Probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	










GIM	dictatorship	 0.0383	 	 ‐0.0497***	 	 0.2601***	 	 ‐0.0447***	 	 0.2242**	
	 (0.0246)	 	 (0.0144)	 	 (0.0932)	 	 (0.0128)	 	 (0.0899)	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 	 0.0885***	 	 0.0944***	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.0090)	 	 (0.0135)	 	 	 	 	 	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 	 0.0515***	 	 0.0442**	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.0108)	 	 (0.0176)	 	 	 	 	 	
Peers,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 	 	 	 	 	 0.1024***	 	 0.1005***	 	







	 Probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	










HQ,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 	 	 	 	 	 0.0586***	 	 0.0513***	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.0120)	 	 (0.0185)	 	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.1064***	 	 	 0.0212	 ‐0.1081***	 	 	 0.0223	 ‐0.1085***	
	 (0.0357)	 	 	 (0.0417)	 (0.0337)	 	 	 (0.0419)	 (0.0338)	
All	cash	 0.0795***	 	 	 0.0002	 0.0817***	 	 	 ‐0.0013	 0.0823***	
	 (0.0256)	 	 	 (0.0320)	 (0.0254)	 	 	 (0.0322)	 (0.0255)	
ln[Size]	 0.0174*	 0.0168**	 ‐0.0105***	 0.0380**	 ‐0.0147	 0.0122	 ‐0.0106***	 0.0365**	 ‐0.0134	
	 (0.0101)	 (0.0083)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0115)	 (0.0084)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0116)	
Leverage	 0.0336	 0.1046*	 0.0271**	 0.1227	 0.0350	 0.1044*	 0.0264**	 0.1159	 0.0408	
	 (0.0749)	 (0.0576)	 (0.0123)	 (0.0996)	 (0.0761)	 (0.0573)	 (0.0119)	 (0.0998)	 (0.0763)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0331	 ‐0.0115	 ‐0.0095***	 ‐0.0014	 ‐0.0307	 ‐0.0097	 ‐0.0092***	 ‐0.0005	 ‐0.0306	
	 (0.0213)	 (0.0076)	 (0.0021)	 (0.0176)	 (0.0188)	 (0.0075)	 (0.0021)	 (0.0176)	 (0.0192)	
Tangibility	 0.0387	 0.0362	 ‐0.0036	 0.0298	 0.0158	 0.0303	 ‐0.0039	 0.0231	 0.0185	
	 (0.0314)	 (0.0295)	 (0.0052)	 (0.0429)	 (0.0320)	 (0.0294)	 (0.0051)	 (0.0430)	 (0.0320)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0693	 ‐0.1517***	 ‐0.0427***	 ‐0.0453	 ‐0.1095	 ‐0.1536***	 ‐0.0411***	 ‐0.0595	 ‐0.1128	
	 (0.0685)	 (0.0558)	 (0.0112)	 (0.0930)	 (0.0691)	 (0.0554)	 (0.0107)	 (0.0937)	 (0.0693)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.1021**	 ‐0.0148	 0.0015	 ‐0.0080	 ‐0.0858*	 ‐0.0114	 0.0016	 ‐0.0068	 ‐0.0904*	
	 (0.0509)	 (0.0144)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0079)	 (0.0490)	 (0.0121)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0070)	 (0.0501)	
ROA	 ‐0.0850	 0.0244	 ‐0.0188	 ‐0.2029	 ‐0.0904	 0.0172	 ‐0.0190	 ‐0.2036	 ‐0.0918	
	 (0.1119)	 (0.0835)	 (0.0175)	 (0.1387)	 (0.1036)	 (0.0822)	 (0.0171)	 (0.1388)	 (0.1048)	
Stock	return	 0.0147	 0.0245***	 ‐0.0022	 0.0391	 ‐0.0182	 0.0218**	 ‐0.0025	 0.0461	 ‐0.0170	
	 (0.0320)	 (0.0088)	 (0.0039)	 (0.0396)	 (0.0321)	 (0.0087)	 (0.0038)	 (0.0394)	 (0.0322)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2185	 ‐0.1358	 ‐0.0714***	 0.0441	 ‐0.2582	 ‐0.1369	 ‐0.0698***	 0.0302	 ‐0.2647	
	 (0.1778)	 (0.1048)	 (0.0230)	 (0.2038)	 (0.1719)	 (0.1044)	 (0.0224)	 (0.2029)	 (0.1732)	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.0521	 0.1753***	 	 	 0.0491	 0.1832***	
	 	 	 	 (0.0891)	 (0.0669)	 	 	 (0.0895)	 (0.0673)	
Constant	 0.1743***	 0.4217***	 0.0564***	 0.4160***	 0.2106***	 0.4217***	 0.0546***	 0.4162***	 0.2009***	






	 Probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	 Recursive,	bi‐probit	










Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Chi2	 41.7***	 712.4***	 225.9***	 698.8***	 207.2***	
Pseudo	R2	%	 5.1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 15.6***	 6.0**	 15.6***	 4.9**	




























	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
BCF	index	 0.0102	 	 ‐0.0319**	 	 	 0.0101	 	
	 (0.0098)	 	 (0.0131)	 	 	 (0.0626)	 	
Peers,	BCF	index	(rolling)	 	 0.2864***	 	 ‐0.0090**	 0.2880***	 	 0.0229	
	 	 (0.0705)	 	 (0.0041)	 (0.1060)	 	 (0.0328)	
HQ,	BCF	index	(rolling)	 	 0.2957***	 	 ‐0.0083**	 0.3952***	 	 ‐0.0088	
	 	 (0.0621)	 	 (0.0034)	 (0.1065)	 	 (0.0310)	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0976***	 	 	 	 0.1844*	 ‐0.0974***	 ‐0.0961***	






	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
All	cash	 0.0789***	 	 	 	 0.0008	 0.0851***	 0.0836***	
	 (0.0259)	 	 	 	 (0.0834)	 (0.0257)	 (0.0260)	
ln[Size]	 0.0195*	 ‐0.0319	 ‐0.0110***	 ‐0.0108***	 0.0534	 ‐0.0038	 ‐0.0037	
	 (0.0107)	 (0.0232)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0393)	 (0.0118)	 (0.0121)	
Leverage	 0.0209	 0.3999**	 0.0201*	 0.0224**	 0.5829**	 0.0538	 0.0610	
	 (0.0744)	 (0.1639)	 (0.0114)	 (0.0102)	 (0.2621)	 (0.0859)	 (0.0742)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0261*	 ‐0.0757***	 ‐0.0076***	 ‐0.0079***	 ‐0.1102***	 ‐0.0307*	 ‐0.0320**	
	 (0.0137)	 (0.0179)	 (0.0022)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0420)	 (0.0178)	 (0.0143)	
Tangibility	 0.0517	 0.1130	 ‐0.0060	 ‐0.0057	 ‐0.0438	 0.0432	 0.0428	
	 (0.0337)	 (0.0833)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1225)	 (0.0337)	 (0.0339)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0565	 ‐0.5383***	 ‐0.0301***	 ‐0.0331***	 ‐0.2849	 ‐0.1124	 ‐0.1150	
	 (0.0684)	 (0.1543)	 (0.0115)	 (0.0089)	 (0.2344)	 (0.0738)	 (0.0705)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0030*	 0.0005	 0.0017	 0.0017	 ‐0.0056	 ‐0.0008	 ‐0.0011	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0068)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0059)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0018)	
ROA	 ‐0.1531	 0.0830	 ‐0.0162	 ‐0.0160	 ‐0.0580	 ‐0.1524	 ‐0.1465	
	 (0.1089)	 (0.2027)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0153)	 (0.3121)	 (0.1069)	 (0.1101)	
Stock	return	 0.0069	 0.1071***	 ‐0.0038	 ‐0.0033	 0.0256	 ‐0.0186	 ‐0.0187	
	 (0.0303)	 (0.0229)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0985)	 (0.0310)	 (0.0314)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2108	 ‐0.6635**	 ‐0.0564**	 ‐0.0598***	 ‐0.2828	 ‐0.2742*	 ‐0.2750*	
	 (0.1609)	 (0.2946)	 (0.0221)	 (0.0192)	 (0.6584)	 (0.1624)	 (0.1606)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 	 0.0415***	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.0123)	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 	 0.0858	 0.2078***	 0.2068***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.2418)	 (0.0727)	 (0.0713)	
Constant	 0.0867	 1.3130***	 0.0461***	 0.0461***	 0.4586	 ‐0.1560	 ‐0.1613	
	 (0.0953)	 (0.2774)	 (0.0079)	 (0.0015)	 (0.4624)	 (0.1647)	 (0.1507)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	






	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Chi2	 	 411.4***	 363.7***	 60.5***	 	
R2	%	 3.9	 	 	 	 	 	 4.7	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 10.7***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 2.4	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 	 0.5	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 12.8***	 	 0.0	 	




























	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
KSW	index	 0.0071	 	 ‐0.0092***	 	 	 0.0717***	 	
	 (0.0064)	 	 (0.0029)	 	 	 (0.0260)	 	
Peers,	KSW	index	(rolling)	 	 0.5948***	 	 ‐0.0041**	 0.6090***	 	 0.0412***	
	 	 (0.0492)	 	 (0.0018)	 (0.0705)	 	 (0.0158)	
HQ,	KSW	index	(rolling)	 	 0.3528***	 	 ‐0.0051**	 0.2079**	 	 0.0228	
	 	 (0.0584)	 	 (0.0023)	 (0.0980)	 	 (0.0185)	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0950***	 	 	 	 ‐0.1122	 ‐0.0855***	 ‐0.0939***	






	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
All	cash	 0.0802***	 	 	 	 ‐0.0566	 0.0917***	 0.0882***	
	 (0.0258)	 	 	 	 (0.1150)	 (0.0268)	 (0.0256)	
ln[Size]	 0.0177	 0.1685***	 ‐0.0103***	 ‐0.0103***	 0.1848***	 ‐0.0194	 ‐0.0054	
	 (0.0109)	 (0.0335)	 (0.0013)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0555)	 (0.0135)	 (0.0120)	
Leverage	 0.0259	 0.1226	 0.0190*	 0.0211**	 0.3501	 0.0321	 0.0550	
	 (0.0739)	 (0.2245)	 (0.0102)	 (0.0102)	 (0.3668)	 (0.0790)	 (0.0743)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0274**	 ‐0.0134	 ‐0.0078***	 ‐0.0078***	 ‐0.0100	 ‐0.0294**	 ‐0.0296**	
	 (0.0136)	 (0.0241)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0654)	 (0.0147)	 (0.0137)	
Tangibility	 0.0511	 0.0785	 ‐0.0053	 ‐0.0053	 ‐0.1077	 0.0381	 0.0301	
	 (0.0338)	 (0.1111)	 (0.0044)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1595)	 (0.0357)	 (0.0338)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0577	 ‐0.2940	 ‐0.0302***	 ‐0.0325***	 ‐0.4689	 ‐0.0768	 ‐0.1089	
	 (0.0682)	 (0.2108)	 (0.0090)	 (0.0089)	 (0.3343)	 (0.0752)	 (0.0699)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0030*	 ‐0.0331**	 0.0017	 0.0017	 0.0077	 ‐0.0008	 ‐0.0001	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0141)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0076)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 ‐0.1442	 0.0162	 ‐0.0195	 ‐0.0178	 ‐1.4199***	 ‐0.0859	 ‐0.1945*	
	 (0.1091)	 (0.2613)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0153)	 (0.4906)	 (0.1159)	 (0.1103)	
Stock	return	 0.0062	 0.0843***	 ‐0.0033	 ‐0.0031	 0.1039	 ‐0.0241	 ‐0.0160	
	 (0.0304)	 (0.0317)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.1449)	 (0.0331)	 (0.0317)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2029	 ‐0.4349	 ‐0.0574***	 ‐0.0589***	 ‐1.6138**	 ‐0.1433	 ‐0.2570	
	 (0.1614)	 (0.4151)	 (0.0199)	 (0.0193)	 (0.7066)	 (0.1704)	 (0.1604)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 	 0.0413***	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.0122)	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 	 0.8571**	 0.1361*	 0.1936***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.3324)	 (0.0780)	 (0.0702)	
Constant	 0.0757	 ‐0.7089	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 ‐1.3028	 ‐0.3850**	 ‐0.5123***	
	 (0.1004)	 (0.5212)	 (0.0020)	 (0.0015)	 (0.8439)	 (0.1511)	 (0.1742)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	






	 Linear	prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
Variables	 Resistance	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Chi2	 	 346.3***	 361.8***	 64.6***	 	
R2	%	 3.9	 	 	 	 	 	 6.0	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 42.2***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 8.2	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 	 0.2	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 10.8***	 	 8.0***	 	

































prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
BCF	index	 0.0077	 	 	 ‐0.0222	 	 	 	 ‐0.0361	 	
	 (0.0105)	 	 	 (0.0151)	 	 	 	 (0.0712)	 	
Peers,	BCF	index	(rolling)	 	 0.1161	 0.0966	 	 ‐0.0054	 0.1639	 0.0558	 	 ‐0.0319	









prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
HQ,	BCF	index	(rolling)	 	 0.2912***	 ‐0.0785	 	 ‐0.0058	 0.3929***	 ‐0.2458	 	 ‐0.0263	
	 	 (0.0669)	 (0.1011)	 	 (0.0037)	 (0.1068)	 (0.1624)	 	 (0.0330)	
KSW	index	 0.0053	 	 	 ‐0.0035	 	 	 	 0.0796***	 	
	 (0.0070)	 	 	 (0.0043)	 	 	 	 (0.0291)	 	
Peers,	KSW	index	(rolling)	 	 0.1307***	 0.5697***	 	 ‐0.0026	 0.1047*	 0.5931***	 	 0.0496***	
	 	 (0.0409)	 (0.0596)	 	 (0.0023)	 (0.0585)	 (0.0857)	 	 (0.0190)	
HQ,	KSW	index	(rolling)	 	 ‐0.0061	 0.3742***	 	 ‐0.0037	 ‐0.0025	 0.2650**	 	 0.0271	
	 	 (0.0454)	 (0.0630)	 	 (0.0025)	 (0.0741)	 (0.1027)	 	 (0.0199)	
Initial	premium	 ‐0.0964***	 	 	 	 	 0.1886*	 ‐0.1338	 ‐0.0790**	 ‐0.0962***	
	 (0.0311)	 	 	 	 	 (0.1066)	 (0.1505)	 (0.0347)	 (0.0305)	
All	cash	 0.0796***	 	 	 	 	 0.0163	 ‐0.0483	 0.0942***	 0.0931***	
	 (0.0260)	 	 	 	 	 (0.0842)	 (0.1174)	 (0.0272)	 (0.0258)	
ln[Size]	 0.0179*	 ‐0.0476**	 0.1685***	 ‐0.0103***	 ‐0.0105***	 0.0453	 0.1834***	 ‐0.0191	 ‐0.0057	
	 (0.0108)	 (0.0242)	 (0.0336)	 (0.0023)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0397)	 (0.0553)	 (0.0137)	 (0.0121)	
Leverage	 0.0216	 0.4331***	 0.1275	 0.0184	 0.0217**	 0.5911**	 0.3740	 0.0520	 0.0583	
	 (0.0744)	 (0.1633)	 (0.2244)	 (0.0121)	 (0.0102)	 (0.2610)	 (0.3691)	 (0.0916)	 (0.0748)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0264*	 ‐0.0712***	 ‐0.0147	 ‐0.0077***	 ‐0.0081***	 ‐0.1112***	 ‐0.0194	 ‐0.0340*	 ‐0.0313**	
	 (0.0137)	 (0.0178)	 (0.0240)	 (0.0023)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0419)	 (0.0658)	 (0.0184)	 (0.0142)	
Tangibility	 0.0511	 0.0979	 0.0800	 ‐0.0053	 ‐0.0052	 ‐0.0661	 ‐0.1011	 0.0370	 0.0299	
	 (0.0337)	 (0.0834)	 (0.1111)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1224)	 (0.1599)	 (0.0364)	 (0.0340)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0559	 ‐0.5500***	 ‐0.3003	 ‐0.0293**	 ‐0.0329***	 ‐0.2865	 ‐0.4740	 ‐0.0836	 ‐0.1098	
	 (0.0684)	 (0.1544)	 (0.2117)	 (0.0121)	 (0.0089)	 (0.2351)	 (0.3378)	 (0.0783)	 (0.0701)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0029*	 0.0034	 ‐0.0336**	 0.0016	 0.0017	 ‐0.0037	 0.0063	 ‐0.0010	 0.0000	
	 (0.0016)	 (0.0066)	 (0.0140)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0058)	 (0.0079)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 ‐0.1474	 0.0954	 0.0392	 ‐0.0176	 ‐0.0150	 ‐0.1013	 ‐1.3371***	 ‐0.0726	 ‐0.1875*	
	 (0.1094)	 (0.2045)	 (0.2634)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0153)	 (0.3175)	 (0.4928)	 (0.1235)	 (0.1131)	
Stock	return	 0.0060	 0.1028***	 0.0856***	 ‐0.0035	 ‐0.0030	 0.0291	 0.1053	 ‐0.0232	 ‐0.0144	








prob.	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	
Linear	
prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
Variables	 Resistance	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.2038	 ‐0.7040**	 ‐0.4312	 ‐0.0553**	 ‐0.0589***	 ‐0.2765	 ‐1.6202**	 ‐0.1412	 ‐0.2595	
	 (0.1617)	 (0.2955)	 (0.4139)	 (0.0227)	 (0.0192)	 (0.6528)	 (0.7109)	 (0.1693)	 (0.1616)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 	 	 0.0395***	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.0121)	 	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 	 	 0.0954	 0.8636***	 0.1318*	 0.1948***	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.2427)	 (0.3343)	 (0.0771)	 (0.0712)	
Constant	 0.0678	 0.9439**	 ‐0.7263	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 0.1138	 ‐1.1456	 ‐0.3420**	 ‐0.4636***	
	 (0.1001)	 (0.3813)	 (0.5297)	 (0.0069)	 (0.0014)	 (0.6172)	 (0.8556)	 (0.1694)	 (0.1790)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 4.3***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.7***	
Chi2	 	 380.1***	 365.9***	 63.1***	 	
R2	%	 4.0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 6.1	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 	 6.2***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 	 2.7	 	
F	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 	 22.0***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	KSW	index)		 	 	 	 	 	 8.5	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 	 	 0.8	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 14.4***	 	 8.8**	 	





















the	GIM	 index	(direct,	causal	 relationship),	 the	actual	premium	offered	by	 the	 initial	bidder	(direct,	causal	relationship),	 the	 indicator	 for	an	all,	 cash	bid,	other	








	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 	 	 0.0504**	 	 0.0535**	 	 0.0535**	 	
	 	 	 (0.0209)	 	 (0.0218)	 	 (0.0223)	 	
Peers,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.0029	 0.5633***	 	 0.5521***	 	 0.5495***	 	 0.0293**	
	 (0.0105)	 (0.0750)	 	 (0.0756)	 	 (0.0758)	 	 (0.0120)	
HQ,	GIM	index	(rolling)	 0.0035	 0.2345**	 	 0.2248**	 	 0.2217**	 	 0.0137	





	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 ‐0.8811	 0.1205	 	 0.1205	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.6469)	 (0.1136)	 	 (0.1165)	 	
Pre‐bid	price	to	high	price	 ‐0.6758***	 	 	 	 	 0.5954	 	 ‐0.0499	
	 (0.0837)	 	 	 	 	 (0.4373)	 	 (0.0713)	
Abnormal,	initial	premium	 	 0.1652	 ‐0.1194***	 1.0463	 ‐0.2404*	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.2181)	 (0.0345)	 (0.6824)	 (0.1230)	 	 	 	
All	cash	 ‐0.0177	 ‐0.0777	 0.0907***	 ‐0.1052	 0.0946***	 ‐0.0896	 0.0946***	 0.0878***	
	 (0.0242)	 (0.1605)	 (0.0266)	 (0.1625)	 (0.0274)	 (0.1610)	 (0.0281)	 (0.0260)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0113	 0.2319***	 ‐0.0136	 0.2066**	 ‐0.0110	 0.2165***	 ‐0.0110	 ‐0.0005	
	 (0.0125)	 (0.0777)	 (0.0132)	 (0.0817)	 (0.0132)	 (0.0794)	 (0.0136)	 (0.0122)	
Leverage	 0.1323*	 0.9616*	 ‐0.0086	 1.0974**	 ‐0.0298	 0.9808*	 ‐0.0298	 0.0379	
	 (0.0699)	 (0.5096)	 (0.0814)	 (0.5153)	 (0.0832)	 (0.5086)	 (0.0862)	 (0.0748)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0189	 ‐0.1240	 ‐0.0214	 ‐0.1397	 ‐0.0189	 ‐0.1230	 ‐0.0189	 ‐0.0276**	
	 (0.0143)	 (0.0925)	 (0.0154)	 (0.0928)	 (0.0157)	 (0.0912)	 (0.0153)	 (0.0135)	
Tangibility	 ‐0.0977***	 ‐0.1533	 0.0505	 ‐0.2391	 0.0627*	 ‐0.1530	 0.0627*	 0.0427	
	 (0.0344)	 (0.2313)	 (0.0349)	 (0.2400)	 (0.0372)	 (0.2321)	 (0.0375)	 (0.0332)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0811	 ‐0.7673*	 ‐0.0625	 ‐0.8470*	 ‐0.0494	 ‐0.7755*	 ‐0.0494	 ‐0.1002	
	 (0.0904)	 (0.4636)	 (0.0759)	 (0.4667)	 (0.0778)	 (0.4615)	 (0.0796)	 (0.0703)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0127***	 ‐0.0008	 0.0004	 ‐0.0091	 0.0015	 0.0021	 0.0015	 0.0001	
	 (0.0018)	 (0.0104)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0118)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0108)	 (0.0020)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 0.2391	 ‐1.4020**	 ‐0.1175	 ‐1.3478**	 ‐0.1197	 ‐1.5585**	 ‐0.1197	 ‐0.1761	
	 (0.1723)	 (0.6806)	 (0.1114)	 (0.6818)	 (0.1108)	 (0.6919)	 (0.1082)	 (0.1093)	
Stock	return	 0.0148	 0.1111	 ‐0.0110	 ‐0.0010	 0.0039	 ‐0.0140	 0.0039	 0.0052	
	 (0.0501)	 (0.2015)	 (0.0322)	 (0.2105)	 (0.0342)	 (0.2134)	 (0.0359)	 (0.0341)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.0050	 ‐1.9031*	 ‐0.1536	 ‐1.9908*	 ‐0.1360	 ‐1.9864*	 ‐0.1360	 ‐0.2422	
	 (0.1461)	 (1.1384)	 (0.1743)	 (1.1451)	 (0.1773)	 (1.1487)	 (0.1801)	 (0.1599)	
Bid	lambda	 ‐0.0360	 0.9712**	 0.1369*	 1.0433**	 0.1246	 1.0750**	 0.1246	 0.1765**	






	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Constant	 0.4121**	 ‐0.9533	 ‐0.4530***	 ‐0.3000	 ‐0.5361***	 ‐0.6631	 ‐0.5361***	 ‐0.5297***	
	 (0.1768)	 (1.2082)	 (0.1581)	 (1.3437)	 (0.1884)	 (1.2434)	 (0.1928)	 (0.1803)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 8.8***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.4***	
Chi2	 	 66.0***	 65.8***	 53.2***	 	
R2	%	 14.0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.9	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 31.7***	 29.6***	 22.1***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 6.4	 6.0	 6.5	 	
F	(first	stage,	Initial	premium)	 	 	 	 	 	 21.9***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	Initial	premium)	 	 	 	 	 	 10.1	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 5.3**	 5.6**	 7.3**	 	



























	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
BCF	index	 	 ‐0.0326**	 	 	 ‐0.0034	 	
	 	 (0.0133)	 	 	 (0.0536)	 	
Peers,	BCF	index	(fixed)	 0.3706***	 	 ‐0.0137***	 0.4577***	 	 0.0105	
	 (0.0912)	 	 (0.0049)	 (0.1283)	 	 (0.0397)	
HQ,	BCF	index	(fixed)	 0.3481***	 	 ‐0.0080*	 0.4935***	 	 ‐0.0106	
	 (0.0747)	 	 (0.0042)	 (0.1150)	 	 (0.0360)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 0.1988*	 ‐0.0955***	 ‐0.0968***	






	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
All	cash	 	 	 	 ‐0.0245	 0.0852***	 0.0846***	
	 	 	 	 (0.0835)	 (0.0257)	 (0.0261)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0368	 ‐0.0108***	 ‐0.0106***	 0.0510	 ‐0.0028	 ‐0.0031	
	 (0.0234)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0389)	 (0.0119)	 (0.0120)	
Leverage	 0.3995**	 0.0202*	 0.0222**	 0.5238**	 0.0600	 0.0587	
	 (0.1637)	 (0.0114)	 (0.0102)	 (0.2600)	 (0.0835)	 (0.0746)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0740***	 ‐0.0077***	 ‐0.0080***	 ‐0.1059**	 ‐0.0327**	 ‐0.0322**	
	 (0.0178)	 (0.0023)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0426)	 (0.0166)	 (0.0144)	
Tangibility	 0.1032	 ‐0.0056	 ‐0.0054	 ‐0.0501	 0.0433	 0.0434	
	 (0.0837)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1216)	 (0.0339)	 (0.0339)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.5378***	 ‐0.0301***	 ‐0.0329***	 ‐0.2930	 ‐0.1168	 ‐0.1162*	
	 (0.1539)	 (0.0116)	 (0.0089)	 (0.2325)	 (0.0732)	 (0.0704)	
Sales	growth	 0.0025	 0.0016	 0.0017	 ‐0.0035	 ‐0.0009	 ‐0.0010	
	 (0.0068)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0056)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0018)	
ROA	 0.0768	 ‐0.0156	 ‐0.0160	 ‐0.0680	 ‐0.1506	 ‐0.1489	
	 (0.2025)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0152)	 (0.3076)	 (0.1070)	 (0.1087)	
Stock	return	 0.1054***	 ‐0.0037	 ‐0.0032	 0.0347	 ‐0.0173	 ‐0.0173	
	 (0.0229)	 (0.0036)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0991)	 (0.0310)	 (0.0314)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.6835**	 ‐0.0557**	 ‐0.0592***	 ‐0.2393	 ‐0.2760*	 ‐0.2741*	
	 (0.2931)	 (0.0221)	 (0.0192)	 (0.6498)	 (0.1613)	 (0.1607)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 0.0409***	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.0122)	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.0600	 0.2080***	 0.2066***	
	 	 	 	 (0.2375)	 (0.0722)	 (0.0716)	
Constant	 1.0449***	 0.0461***	 0.0461***	 ‐0.0678	 ‐0.1282	 ‐0.1315	
	 (0.3125)	 (0.0080)	 (0.0015)	 (0.4819)	 (0.1495)	 (0.1531)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	






	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Chi2	 418.5***	 367.0***	 59.2***	 	
R2	%	 	 	 	 	 	 4.6	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 16.3***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	BCF	index)		 	 	 	 3.4	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 0.1	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 13.1***	 	 0.1	 	
























(indirect,	 causal	 relationship),	 the	 other	 variables,	 and	 the	 lambda	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 censoring	 firm	 years	 absent	 a	 bid.	 Standard	 errors	 are	 shown	 in	 brackets	
underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	(1),	(2),	and	(3),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	(4),	(5),	and	(6).	***,	**,	*	denote	statistical	
significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
KSW	index	 	 ‐0.0082***	 	 	 0.0666***	 	
	 	 (0.0026)	 	 	 (0.0243)	 	
Peers,	KSW	index	(fixed)	 0.6943***	 	 ‐0.0047**	 0.6771***	 	 0.0393**	
	 (0.0521)	 	 (0.0020)	 (0.0756)	 	 (0.0167)	
HQ,	KSW	index	(fixed)	 0.4203***	 	 ‐0.0043*	 0.2571***	 	 0.0350*	
	 (0.0650)	 	 (0.0024)	 (0.0971)	 	 (0.0201)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 ‐0.1059	 ‐0.0861***	 ‐0.0937***	







	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
All	cash	 	 	 	 ‐0.0575	 0.0912***	 0.0886***	
	 	 	 	 (0.1142)	 (0.0267)	 (0.0256)	
ln[Size]	 0.1440***	 ‐0.0102***	 ‐0.0102***	 0.1751***	 ‐0.0182	 ‐0.0052	
	 (0.0336)	 (0.0013)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0548)	 (0.0133)	 (0.0120)	
Leverage	 0.1176	 0.0191*	 0.0210**	 0.3884	 0.0344	 0.0550	
	 (0.2224)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0102)	 (0.3668)	 (0.0784)	 (0.0743)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0044	 ‐0.0078***	 ‐0.0078***	 ‐0.0062	 ‐0.0298**	 ‐0.0295**	
	 (0.0237)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0643)	 (0.0145)	 (0.0139)	
Tangibility	 0.0470	 ‐0.0052	 ‐0.0052	 ‐0.1637	 0.0383	 0.0273	
	 (0.1109)	 (0.0044)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1577)	 (0.0355)	 (0.0340)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.3118	 ‐0.0301***	 ‐0.0322***	 ‐0.5354	 ‐0.0797	 ‐0.1115	
	 (0.2091)	 (0.0089)	 (0.0089)	 (0.3367)	 (0.0745)	 (0.0697)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0265**	 0.0016	 0.0017	 0.0092	 ‐0.0008	 0.0000	
	 (0.0121)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0075)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 ‐0.0118	 ‐0.0194	 ‐0.0186	 ‐1.4680***	 ‐0.0902	 ‐0.2006*	
	 (0.2588)	 (0.0151)	 (0.0152)	 (0.4835)	 (0.1147)	 (0.1094)	
Stock	return	 0.0695**	 ‐0.0033	 ‐0.0031	 0.1283	 ‐0.0233	 ‐0.0135	
	 (0.0313)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0035)	 (0.1445)	 (0.0328)	 (0.0318)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.4113	 ‐0.0579***	 ‐0.0593***	 ‐1.6279**	 ‐0.1537	 ‐0.2622	
	 (0.4155)	 (0.0199)	 (0.0193)	 (0.6877)	 (0.1691)	 (0.1601)	
California	incorporation	 	 	 0.0415***	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.0122)	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 0.8618***	 0.1413*	 0.1930***	
	 	 	 	 (0.3319)	 (0.0778)	 (0.0702)	
Constant	 ‐1.7008***	 0.0460***	 0.0460***	 ‐1.9854**	 ‐0.3675**	 ‐0.5783***	
	 (0.5643)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0014)	 (0.8452)	 (0.1453)	 (0.1783)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	






	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Variables	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Chi2	 343.7***	 361.0***	 64.5***	 	
R2	%	 	 	 	 	 	 6.0	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 47.2***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	KSW	index)		 	 	 	 9.1	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 0.8	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 10.4***	 	 7.8***	 	



















conditional	 on	 a	bid,	 but	with	 the	addition	of	 an	 exclusion	 restriction,	 California	 incorporation,	which,	with	 a	 lag	of	one	year,	 is	 equal	 to	one	 for	a	 firm	 that	 is	
incorporated	in	California	in	the	Center	for	Research	in	Security	Prices/Compustat	Merged	database,	and	to	zero	otherwise.	Columns	(5)	and	(6)	are	the	joint,	first	





but	 in	reduced	 form,	by	 linear	probability	regressing	the	 likelihood	of	management	resistance	on	the	 fixed	 instruments,	only,	 for	 the	BCF	 index	and	KSW	index	
(indirect,	 causal	 relationships),	 the	other	variables,	 and	 the	 lambda	 for	 the	effects	of	 censoring	 firm	years	absent	a	bid.	 Standard	errors	are	 shown	 in	brackets	
underneath	the	marginal	effects.	These	are	firm	clustered,	robust	in	Columns	(1),	(2),	(3),	and	(4),	and	bootstrapped	in	Columns	(5),	(6),	(7),	and	(8).	***,	**,	*	denote	
statistical	significance	at	the	one,	five,	and	ten	percent	levels,	respectively.	
	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
BCF	index	 	 	 ‐0.0214	 	 	 	 ‐0.0769	 	
	 	 	 (0.0161)	 	 	 	 (0.0645)	 	
Peers,	BCF	index	(fixed)	 0.1025	 0.1514	 	 ‐0.0104	 0.3776**	 0.0456	 	 ‐0.0672	
	 (0.1157)	 (0.1792)	 	 (0.0067)	 (0.1546)	 (0.2305)	 	 (0.0511)	
HQ,	BCF	index	(fixed)	 0.3398***	 ‐0.0579	 	 ‐0.0057	 0.4968***	 ‐0.1317	 	 ‐0.0330	







	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
KSW	index	 	 	 ‐0.0028	 	 	 	 0.0841***	 	
	 	 	 (0.0044)	 	 	 	 (0.0286)	 	
Peers,	KSW	index	(fixed)	 0.1624***	 0.6532***	 	 ‐0.0018	 0.0542	 0.6615***	 	 0.0573***	
	 (0.0463)	 (0.0668)	 	 (0.0026)	 (0.0650)	 (0.0970)	 	 (0.0216)	
HQ,	KSW	index	(fixed)	 ‐0.0006	 0.4362***	 	 ‐0.0029	 ‐0.0041	 0.2883***	 	 0.0387*	
	 (0.0501)	 (0.0704)	 	 (0.0027)	 (0.0702)	 (0.1042)	 	 (0.0214)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 	 0.2010*	 ‐0.1183	 ‐0.0725**	 ‐0.0970***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.1070)	 (0.1504)	 (0.0348)	 (0.0303)	
All	cash	 	 	 	 	 ‐0.0163	 ‐0.0530	 0.0962***	 0.0972***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.0843)	 (0.1181)	 (0.0276)	 (0.0261)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0561**	 0.1462***	 ‐0.0101***	 ‐0.0104***	 0.0466	 0.1762***	 ‐0.0175	 ‐0.0056	
	 (0.0245)	 (0.0337)	 (0.0024)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0394)	 (0.0549)	 (0.0138)	 (0.0121)	
Leverage	 0.4353***	 0.1162	 0.0185	 0.0218**	 0.5363**	 0.3931	 0.0747	 0.0635	
	 (0.1636)	 (0.2227)	 (0.0122)	 (0.0102)	 (0.2601)	 (0.3715)	 (0.0908)	 (0.0752)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0699***	 ‐0.0043	 ‐0.0077***	 ‐0.0081***	 ‐0.1068**	 ‐0.0086	 ‐0.0395**	 ‐0.0319**	
	 (0.0177)	 (0.0237)	 (0.0024)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0425)	 (0.0649)	 (0.0176)	 (0.0143)	
Tangibility	 0.0859	 0.0484	 ‐0.0051	 ‐0.0050	 ‐0.0633	 ‐0.1584	 0.0365	 0.0259	
	 (0.0838)	 (0.1110)	 (0.0045)	 (0.0044)	 (0.1215)	 (0.1585)	 (0.0374)	 (0.0343)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.5579***	 ‐0.3105	 ‐0.0291**	 ‐0.0327***	 ‐0.2971	 ‐0.5396	 ‐0.0930	 ‐0.1118	
	 (0.1541)	 (0.2093)	 (0.0125)	 (0.0089)	 (0.2337)	 (0.3381)	 (0.0794)	 (0.0701)	
Sales	growth	 0.0059	 ‐0.0269**	 0.0016	 0.0016	 ‐0.0029	 0.0089	 ‐0.0013	 0.0000	
	 (0.0068)	 (0.0122)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0056)	 (0.0076)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 0.0963	 ‐0.0099	 ‐0.0178	 ‐0.0156	 ‐0.0809	 ‐1.4498***	 ‐0.0615	 ‐0.1920*	
	 (0.2039)	 (0.2619)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0153)	 (0.3096)	 (0.4862)	 (0.1248)	 (0.1115)	
Stock	return	 0.0995***	 0.0703**	 ‐0.0035	 ‐0.0031	 0.0359	 0.1308	 ‐0.0211	 ‐0.0115	
	 (0.0228)	 (0.0313)	 (0.0036)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0992)	 (0.1444)	 (0.0339)	 (0.0317)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.7140**	 ‐0.4088	 ‐0.0555**	 ‐0.0589***	 ‐0.2359	 ‐1.6390**	 ‐0.1446	 ‐0.2651	







	 IV,	probit	 Probit	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Bid	 Bid	 BCF	index	 KSW	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
California	incorporation	 	 	 	 0.0396***	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.0121)	 	 	 	 	
Bid	lambda	 	 	 	 	 0.0655	 0.8686***	 0.1282	 0.1925***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.2385)	 (0.3342)	 (0.0782)	 (0.0716)	
Constant	 0.6692	 ‐1.7518***	 0.0460***	 0.0461***	 ‐0.2016	 ‐1.9105**	 ‐0.2738*	 ‐0.4917***	
	 (0.4177)	 (0.5773)	 (0.0071)	 (0.0014)	 (0.6017)	 (0.8542)	 (0.1595)	 (0.1840)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.6***	
Chi2	 375.8***	 367.0***	 59.2***	 	
R2	%	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 6.2	
Pseudo	R2	%			 	 	 	 4.9	 	 	 	 	
F	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 8.2***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	BCF	index)	 	 	 	 	 3.4	 	
F	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 23.5***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	KSW	index)	 	 	 	 	 9.1	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 	 	 	 1.6	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 13.8***	 	 10.0***	 	














Columns	(2)	and	(3)	are	 the	 first	and	second	stages,	respectively,	of	an	 instrumental‐variables	(IV),	 linear	probability	regression	(using	 two‐stage	 least‐squares	
















	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
GIM	index	 	 	 0.0447**	 	 0.0475**	 	 0.0475**	 	
	 	 	 (0.0191)	 	 (0.0197)	 	 (0.0202)	 	
Peers,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 0.0042	 0.6369***	 	 0.6266***	 	 0.6234***	 	 0.0274**	







	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
HQ,	GIM	index	(fixed)	 ‐0.0012	 0.3137***	 	 0.3003***	 	 0.3012***	 	 0.0219	
	 (0.0132)	 (0.1024)	 	 (0.1032)	 	 (0.1030)	 	 (0.0159)	
Initial	premium	 	 	 	 ‐0.7570	 0.1094	 	 0.1094	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.6386)	 (0.1106)	 	 (0.1135)	 	
Pre‐bid	price	to	high	price	 ‐0.6744***	 	 	 	 	 0.5105	 	 ‐0.0525	
	 (0.0840)	 	 	 	 	 (0.4305)	 	 (0.0711)	
Abnormal,	initial	premium	 	 0.1688	 ‐0.1181***	 0.9258	 ‐0.2280*	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.2192)	 (0.0341)	 (0.6752)	 (0.1199)	 	 	 	
All	cash	 ‐0.0180	 ‐0.0882	 0.0902***	 ‐0.1118	 0.0938***	 ‐0.0982	 0.0938***	 0.0876***	
	 (0.0242)	 (0.1600)	 (0.0264)	 (0.1617)	 (0.0271)	 (0.1603)	 (0.0277)	 (0.0260)	
ln[Size]	 ‐0.0117	 0.2223***	 ‐0.0121	 0.2006**	 ‐0.0097	 0.2094***	 ‐0.0097	 ‐0.0001	
	 (0.0125)	 (0.0765)	 (0.0129)	 (0.0800)	 (0.0130)	 (0.0778)	 (0.0134)	 (0.0122)	
Leverage	 0.1342*	 0.9320*	 ‐0.0028	 1.0509**	 ‐0.0221	 0.9493*	 ‐0.0221	 0.0338	
	 (0.0700)	 (0.5056)	 (0.0803)	 (0.5112)	 (0.0817)	 (0.5049)	 (0.0844)	 (0.0748)	
Market‐to‐book	 ‐0.0192	 ‐0.1152	 ‐0.0226	 ‐0.1290	 ‐0.0203	 ‐0.1144	 ‐0.0203	 ‐0.0274**	
	 (0.0143)	 (0.0917)	 (0.0150)	 (0.0920)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0906)	 (0.0148)	 (0.0138)	
Tangibility	 ‐0.0975***	 ‐0.2185	 0.0507	 ‐0.2909	 0.0618*	 ‐0.2171	 0.0618*	 0.0408	
	 (0.0344)	 (0.2278)	 (0.0346)	 (0.2364)	 (0.0367)	 (0.2287)	 (0.0369)	 (0.0333)	
Liquidity	 ‐0.0825	 ‐0.8463*	 ‐0.0677	 ‐0.9146*	 ‐0.0558	 ‐0.8522*	 ‐0.0558	 ‐0.1028	
	 (0.0902)	 (0.4634)	 (0.0747)	 (0.4662)	 (0.0763)	 (0.4615)	 (0.0780)	 (0.0701)	
Sales	growth	 ‐0.0128***	 0.0048	 0.0003	 ‐0.0024	 0.0013	 0.0072	 0.0013	 0.0004	
	 (0.0018)	 (0.0102)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0115)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0105)	 (0.0020)	 (0.0017)	
ROA	 0.2443	 ‐1.5272**	 ‐0.1215	 ‐1.4758**	 ‐0.1235	 ‐1.6607**	 ‐0.1235	 ‐0.1825*	
	 (0.1712)	 (0.6688)	 (0.1101)	 (0.6698)	 (0.1096)	 (0.6824)	 (0.1069)	 (0.1078)	
Stock	return	 0.0144	 0.1518	 ‐0.0099	 0.0547	 0.0036	 0.0438	 0.0036	 0.0085	
	 (0.0501)	 (0.2013)	 (0.0318)	 (0.2099)	 (0.0338)	 (0.2126)	 (0.0354)	 (0.0342)	
Industry	concentration	 ‐0.0054	 ‐1.8953*	 ‐0.1666	 ‐1.9708*	 ‐0.1505	 ‐1.9668*	 ‐0.1505	 ‐0.2433	






	 Linear	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 IV,	linear	prob.	 Linear	prob.	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Variables	
Initial	
premium	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 GIM	index	 Resistance	 Resistance	
Bid	lambda	 ‐0.0346	 0.9593**	 0.1439*	 1.0228**	 0.1326*	 1.0490**	 0.1326*	 0.1740**	
	 (0.0824)	 (0.4711)	 (0.0794)	 (0.4758)	 (0.0805)	 (0.4790)	 (0.0803)	 (0.0710)	
Constant	 0.4422**	 ‐2.1607*	 ‐0.4226***	 ‐1.5523	 ‐0.4983***	 ‐1.8871	 ‐0.4983***	 ‐0.5826***	
	 (0.1859)	 (1.1524)	 (0.1477)	 (1.2798)	 (0.1747)	 (1.1820)	 (0.1791)	 (0.1852)	
Year	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Industry	indicators	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
F	 8.7***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.4***	
Chi2	 	 65.8***	 65.6***	 53.1***	 	
R2	%	 14.0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4.8	
F	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 37.2***	 34.8***	 25.3***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	GIM	index)	 	 7.3	 6.9	 7.4	 	
F	(first	stage,	Initial	premium)	 	 	 	 	 	 21.5***	 	
R2	%	(first	stage,	Initial	premium)		 	 	 	 	 	 10.1	 	
Chi2	(over‐identification)	 	 0.2	 0.3	 0.3	 	
Chi2	(endogeneity)	 	 4.8**	 5.2**	 7.0**	 	
Obs	 954	 954	 954	 954	 954	
	
